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INTRODUCTION

The Illinois Supreme Court decided issues relating to admission
to the bar, professional responsibility, and reinstatement to the bar
during this Survey year.' This Article will analyze issues resolved
by the Supreme Court of Illinois in reported opinions. 2 Furthermore, it will apprise the practitioner of new developments in the
area of professional ethics and it will discuss the impact of these
court decisions.
* Chief Counsel, Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission; B.A.,
1977, Lewis College; J.D., 1980, Loyola University of Chicago.
** B.S., 1984, Northwestern University; J.D. candidate, 1990, Loyola University of
Chicago.
1. The Survey year is from July 1, 1987, to July 1, 1988. Most disciplinary actions are
disposed of before reaching the court. On January 1, 1987, there were 4,336 charges
pending, and during 1987, 4,886 charges were docketed. 1987 ARDC ANN. REP. at 5
(1988). Of the 5,628 investigations terminated in 1987, 229 formal complaints were voted
to be filed. Id. The Administrator closed 4,542 cases and the Inquiry Board closed or
dismissed 1,275. Id. This report encompasses the period of April 30, 1987, to April 30,
1988. Id. at 3.
2. This article will only encompass reported opinions of the Illinois Supreme Court.
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THE ATTORNEY REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY
COMMISSION

The registration and discipline of members of the Illinois bar is
supervised by the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission ("ARDC").3 An administrator oversees the ARDC,4 and his
two principal duties are to investigate attorney conduct5 and to
prosecute disciplinary cases.6

The ARDC appoints an Inquiry Board composed of no less than
twenty-one members7 and a Hearing Board composed of at least
twenty-one members.' The Inquiry Board investigates charges
against attorneys,9 and it may dispose of investigations by voting to
dismiss, by closing an investigation or by filing a complaint with
the Hearing Board.1" The Hearing Board 1 hears complaints and
makes findings of fact, conclusions of fact and law, 12 and
recommendations. 13
The supreme court appoints a nine-member Review Board
which reviews Hearing Board recommendations when exceptions
3. The Illinois Supreme Court appoints seven members to serve on the ARDC for a
three-year term. ILL. S. CT. R. 751(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, para. 751(b) (1987).
Prior to August 1, 1987, the ARDC consisted of four members of the bar. ILL. S. CT. R.
751(b), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 751(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986). The rule as
amended requires the ARDC to include three laypersons. ILL. S. CT. R. 751(b), ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 751(b) (1987). A quorum to conduct business consists of
four members. ILL. S. CT. R. 751(d), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 751(d) (1987).
4. ILL. S. CT. R. 752, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11A, para. 752 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1988). The ARDC now appoints the administrator with the consent of the court. Id.
5. Rule 752(a) provides that the Administrator shall investigate "on his own motion,
on the recommendation of an Inquiry Board or at the instance of an aggrieved party,"
attorney conduct which "tends to defeat the administration of justice or to bring the
courts or the legal profession into disrepute." ILL. S. CT. R. 752(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
Sl10A, para. 752(a) (1987).
6. ILL. S. CT. R. 752(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10A, para. 752(b) (1987).
7. ILL. S. CT. R. 753(a)(1), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 753(a)(1) (1987).
8. ILL. S. CT. R. 753(c)(1), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 753(c)(1) (1987).
9. ILL. S. CT. R. 753(a)(2), ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 1 10A, para. 753(a)(2) (1987). The
Inquiry Board may initiate its own investigation, it may refer investigations to the Administrator, and it may investigate matters referred to it by the Administrator. Id. The
Board acts in panels consisting of no less than three members. ILL. S. CT. R. 753(a)(4),
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 753(a)(4) (1987). The majority of panel members constitutes a quorum and a concurrence of the majority is necessary to decide a matter. Id.
10. ILL. S. CT. R. 753(a)(3), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 753(a)(3) (1987).
11. See ILL. S. CT. R. 753(c)(2), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I1lOA, para. 753(c)(2) (1987).
12. Rule 753(c)(6) establishes that the standard of proof in all hearings is clear and
convincing evidence, except as otherwise provided by Illinois Supreme Court Rules. ILL.
S. CT. R. 753(c)(6), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 753(c)(6) (1987).
13. ILL. S. CT. R. 753(c)(3), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 753(c)(3) (1987). The
Hearing Board makes recommendations for discipline, non-disciplinary suspension, or
dismissal of the complaint. Id.
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are filed by either party. 14 The Review Board may approve, reject,
or modify Hearing Board findings.1" Whenever the Review Board
decides that public disciplinary action should be imposed, it files a
report with the Illinois Supreme Court. 16 When a report is filed,
the court reviews the Boards' findings and determines whether discipline should be imposed and, if so, the severity of the discipline. 17
One of the responsibilities of the ARDC is to report on its activities annually. 8 Among other things, the ARDC's report presents
the caseloads of the various administrative boards and publicly announces recent administrative changes in the ARDC. Two announcements were presented in the most recent report. First, the
membership of the ARDC was expanded to include laypersons as
well as lawyers.1 9 Second, on September 1, 1987, the court appointed a seven-member Blue Ribbon Committee to study the
ARDC's function and operation.20
The disciplinary caseload continued to rise this year, reaching a
record high.2 The supreme court decided 340 disciplinary cases
during 1987, it ordered discipline
in 103 cases, 22 and it took non23
cases.
154
in
action
disciplinary
II.

THE ADMISSION PROCESS

There was no decision more highly debated during the Survey
14. ILL. S. CT. R. 753(d), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 753(d) (1987). The court
appoints one member as chairman who generally serves for a three-year term. Id. A
quorum consists of five members and a decision requires a concurrence of at least five
members. Id.
15. ILL. S. CT. R. 753(c)(3), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 753(c)(3) (1987).
16. ILL. S. CT. R. 753(c)(4), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 753(c)(4) (1987).
17. While the court will give the Boards' records due deference, final responsibility
for determining the appropriate sanction in attorney discipline cases rests with the
supreme court. In re Harris, 93 Ill. 2d 285, 291-92, 443 N.E.2d 557, 559 (1982).
18. ILL. S. CT. R. 751(e)(6), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IIOA, para. 751(e)(6) (1987).
19. 1987 ARDC ANN. REP. at 4 (1988). This expansion was pursuant to the
supreme court's amendment of Rule 751; three new members were appointed on August
31, 1987. See supra note 3.
20. 1987 ARDC ANN. REP. at 4 (1988).
21. Id. at 4-5. See supra note 1.
22. 1987 ARDC ANN. REP. at 5 (1988). The action taken was as follows: Fifty-four
attorneys were disbarred, thirty-nine were suspended, and ten were censured. Id. Censure is "[a]n official reprimand or condemnation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 115 (5th
ed. 1979).
23. 1987 ARDC ANN. REP. at 5 (1988). Pursuant to rules 767, 770, and 759 respectively, non-disciplinary types of action deal with petitions for reinstatement, transfers to
inactive status, and petitions for restoration. See ILL. S. CT. R. 767, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
1 1A, para. 767 (1987); ILL. S. CT. R. 770, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l1l0A, para. 770 (1987);
ILL. S. CT. R. 759, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 759 (1987).
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year than In re Loss.24 In an unprecedented decision, the supreme
court denied an applicant admission to the bar after the Committee
on Character and Fitness ("Committee") certified to the Board of
Examiners that he was fit for admission. Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 708 sets forth the procedures for an attorney's admission to
the Illinois bar. 26 The rule, as recently amended, provides that if
the Committee certifies an applicant's fitness to practice law to the
Board of Law Examiners, "the applicant shall thereafter be admitted to the bar unless the court orders otherwise. ' 27 Prior to the
amendment, Rule 708(c) contained no explicitly written provision
entitling the court to overturn the Committee's decision to admit
an applicant. 2 The court defended its review of the Committee's
decision by declaring that a literal interpretation of Rule 708(c)
would elicit absurd results. 29 The court explained that such an interpretation would result in an unconstitutional delegation of its
power to the Committee.3 ° It reasoned that if the Committee is not
subject to judicial review, then the court has unconstitutionally abdicated its authority to oversee the Committee.3 '
Although Loss argued that the non-literal interpretation of the
rule violated his due process rights, the court concluded other24. 119 Ill. 2d 186, 518 N.E.2d 981 (1987).
25. Id. at 198, 518 N.E.2d at 986.
26. ILL. S. CT. R. 708, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IIOA, para. 708 (1987). Rule 708(a)
provides for the appointment of the Committee on Character and Fitness, which consists
of at least three members of the bar. ILL. S. CT. R. 708(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 A,
para. 708(a) (1987). Rule 708(b) requires the Committee to decide whether each applicant has the "good moral character and general fitness to practice law." ILL. S. CT. R.
708(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 A, para. 708(b) (1987).
27. ILL. S. CT. R. 708(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 708(c) (1987) (emphasis
added).
28. Id. Prior to the amendment there was only one mechanism for judicial review of
an applicant who was denied admission; the applicant could petition the court for relief
so long as notice was given to the Committee. ILL. S. CT. R. 708(d), ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110A, para. 708(d) (1987). The standard of review applied by the court is whether the
Committee's decision was arbitrary. Loss, 119 I11.
2d at 219, 518 N.E.2d at 995 (Simon,
J., dissenting) (citing In re Latimer, I111l. 2d 327, 330, 143 N.E.2d 20, 22, cert. denied,
355 U.S. 82 (1957); In re Ascher, 81 11. 2d 485, 487, 411 N.E.2d 1, 7 (1980)).
29. Loss, 119 Ill. 2d at 194-95, 518 N.E.2d at 984. Although Rule 708 was amended
and became effective prior to the date of this opinion, Loss' application for admission was
submitted on November 21, 1984. Id. at 189, 518 N.E.2d at 982. At that time there was
no statutory provision explicitly entitling the court to overturn the Committee's decision
to admit an applicant. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
30. Loss, 119 Ill. 2d at 194-95, 518 N.E.2d at 984.
31. Id. The court reaffirmed its authority to regulate the Illinois bar. Id. at 192, 518
N.E.2d at 983. See also In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 94, 54 N.E. 646, 652 (1899) (the court
possesses the power to pass upon the fitness of an applicant to the bar). Moreover, the
Committee on Character and Fitness was created by the court. ILL. S. CT. R. 708(a),
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 708(a) (1987).
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wise. 32 The court emphasized that even though Loss may have relied upon unfortunate language in the rule, that language would
not be interpreted so as to divest33 the court of its jurisdiction "to
perform its constitutional duty."
After deciding that Loss was afforded "all of the due process
which the situation required," 34 the court proceeded to consider
whether he should be admitted to the bar. 35 The court explained
that, generally, a petitioner bears the burden of establishing his
present moral character.36 The court declared, however, that when
a petitioner such as Loss has a prior record of misconduct, he must
undertake an additional burden. 37 Like an applicant for reinstatement to the bar, the petitioner must show by clear and convincing
evidence that he is rehabilitated such that he is fit to practice law,
and that he is prepared to return to a helpful, useful, and trustful
role in society.38
The court stressed that rehabilitation is the most important consideration in determining whether an applicant is fit for admission
to the bar. 39 The court listed the following six factors which constitute indicia of rehabilitation of character and fitness:
(1) community service and achievements, as well as the opinions
of others regarding present character; (2) candor before the
court; (3) the age of the applicant at the time of the offenses;
32. Loss, 119 Ill. 2d at 193, 518 N.E.2d at 983-84. The court reasoned that "an
applicant for admission to the bar has no vested interest in the continued existence of a
rule of this court." Id. (citing Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill. 2d 196, 208, 417 N.E.2d 1336,
1342 (1981)).
33. Id. at 195, 518 N.E.2d at 984.
34. Id. at 195, 518 N.E.2d at 985. At the supreme court level, Loss was allowed to file
a brief and to present oral argument. Id. at 190, 518 N.E.2d at 982.
35. Id. at 195, 518 N.E.2d at 985.
36. Id. (citing In re Ascher, 81 11. 2d 485, 498, 411 N.E.2d 1, 7 (1980)).
37. Id. The court listed a number of Loss' wrongdoings that were recorded at his
hearing before the Committee. Id. at 190, 518 N.E.2d at 982-83. The misconduct involved addictions to drugs and alcohol, and criminal activities. Id. Although the court
noted that the record was unclear as to the number of convictions against Loss, he had
been charged with robbery, disorderly conduct, and a variety of drug-related crimes. Id.
at 190-91, 518 N.E.2d at 982. Finally, the court mentioned that Loss misstated and
omitted facts about his background in his application to law school. Id. at 191, 518
N.E.2d at 982.
38. Id. at 195-96, 518 N.E.2d at 985 (citing In re Wigoda, 77 Ill. 2d 154, 159, 395
N.E.2d 571, 573-74 (1979)). In contrast, Justice Simon argued that "[u]nlike the attorney
petitioning for reinstatement ... an applicant in Loss's position has never breached nor
abused a position of public trust such as an attorney occupies." Id. at 223, 518 N.E.2d at
998 (Simon, J., dissenting). According to Simon, the burden placed on Loss was inapplicable because his misconduct did not bear on the public trust, the profession, or the
dissenting).
administration of justice. Id. at 223-24, 518 N.E.2d at 998 (Simon, J.,
39. Id. at 196, 518 N.E.2d at 985.
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(4) the amount of time which has passed since the last offense;
(5) the nature of the offenses; and (6) the applicant's current
mental state. 4°

After a brief discussion of Loss's evidence of good moral character,41 the court noted that the Administrator had not presented evidence at the committee hearing.42 The Administrator, however,
had been appointed by the court to raise matters which were adverse to Loss's case at the supreme court level.43 Although the
evidence which Loss presented was uncontroverted, 44 the court
ruled that the evidence neither established Loss's good character
nor proved that he was sufficiently rehabilitated to be admitted to
the Illinois bar.45
On the other hand, the court declared that Loss, like a disbarred
attorney, could reapply for admission to the bar after an appropriate period of time, which in Loss's case was found to be immediately.4 6 In addition to the relevant factors that the Committee is
normally required to consider,47 the court provided three factors
that the Committee would be required to consider should Loss
reapply.48 These factors were Loss's conduct following the court
proceeding, his candor in the new application, and his candor in
40. Id. (citing Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957)). See
also, ILL. S. CT. R. 767(f)(l)-(6), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 767(f)(1)-(6) (1987).
41. The court noted that Loss graduated from law school with honors, that he was on
law review, and that he tutored a handicapped law student. Loss, 119 Ill. 2d at 196, 518
N.E.2d at 985. In addition, Loss presented numerous character witnesses, including the
Dean of DePaul College of Law, who attested to his good character. Id. at 196, 225, 518
N.E.2d at 985, 998. Finally, Loss asserted that his last arrest occurred 11 years before
the court proceeding and that he had overcome both his alcohol and drug addiction. Id.
at 196, 518 N.E.2d at 985.
42. Id. While the case was under advisement, the Administrator moved to supplement the record before the court with recently uncovered evidence. Id. at 196-97, 518
N.E.2d at 985. Based on allegations in the Administrator's motion for leave to supplement, the court asserted that those allegations, if verified, might be relevant to the issue of
rehabilitation. By implication, the Administrator's motion to supplement the record was
not granted. Nevertheless, the court did have the opportunity to read the supplemental
allegations and may have given them some credibility. Id. at 197, 518 N.E.2d at 985. But
see id. at 227, 518 N.E.2d at 999 (Simon, J., dissenting) ("[t]he information submitted to
the court subsequent to the hearing is both unproved and irrelevant.
43. Id. at 196-97, 518 N.E.2d at 985.
44. Id. at 196, 518 N.E.2d at 985.
45. Id. at 197, 518 N.E.2d at 985.
46. Id. at 197, 518 N.E.2d at 986. Rule 767(a) pertains to the filing of petitions for
reinstatement and the minimum time period which must elapse between an order of discipline and the time in which a petition may be filed. ILL. S. CT. R. 767(a), ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110A, para. 767(a) (1987).
47. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
48. Loss, 119 Ill. 2d at 196, 518 N.E.2d at 985.
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response to any inquiry made by the Committee.4 9
In a scathing dissent, Justice Simon criticized the majority's ruling on numerous grounds.,o Justice Simon set forth three principal
arguments." First, citing Illinois Supreme Court Rule 708(c),52
Justice Simon asserted that the majority ignored the clear mandate
of the rule.5 3 Specifically, he explained that the Committee is a
branch of the court which was created pursuant to a proper delegation of authority. 4 Thus, no abdication of authority took place,
and therefore no constitutional issue was presented."
Second, Justice Simon argued that the majority deprived Loss of
due process by refusing to follow the court's own rules. 56 Furthermore, Simon maintained that the proceeding ordered by the court
was "fundamentally unfair."5 7 Simon based this argument upon
two facts: the court failed to inform Loss of the way in which his
case came before the court, and the court failed to notify Loss of
the specific issues to be addressed during the proceeding. 8
Finally, Simon argued that the majority created an unprecedented burden of proof, labeled it a standard of review, and then
applied it to Loss.59 In addition, Simon maintained that the majority deprived Loss of due process by failing to inform him of his
49. Id. at 198, 518 N.E.2d at 986 (citing In re DeBartolo, 111 I11.
2d 1, 6-7, 488
N.E.2d 947, 949 (1986)).
50. Id. at 218-28, 518 N.E.2d at 995-1000 (Simon, J., dissenting).
51. Id. (Simon, J., dissenting).
52. ILL. S. CT. R. 708(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 A, para. 708(c) (1987). In part, the
rule states that if the Committee certifies to the Board of Law Examiners that an applicant is of good moral character, then the "applicant shall thereafter be entitled to admission to the bar." Loss, 119 Ill. 2d at 218, 518 N.E.2d at 995 (Simon, J., dissenting) (citing
ILL. S. CT. R. 708(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I1OA, para. 708(c) (1987) (emphasis in
original)).
53. Id. at 218-19, 518 N.E.2d at 996 (Simon, J., dissenting).
54. Id. (Simon, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 220, 518 N.E.2d at 996 (Simon, J., dissenting).
56. Id. (Simon, J., dissenting).
57. Id. (Simon, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 220-21, 518 N.E.2d at 996 (Simon, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 222, 518 N.E.2d at 997 (Simon, J., dissenting). The standard the court
employs when reviewing denials of certification is whether the Committee acted arbitrarily. Id. at 193, 518 N.E.2d at 984 (Simon, J., dissenting). Yet, the majority without
explanation concluded that the appropriate "standard" was clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 222, 518 N.E.2d at 997 (Simon, J., dissenting). Simon explained that the
party seeking reversal of an administrative body's finding bears the burden of proof. Id.
(Simon, J., dissenting). In the present case, the Illinois Supreme Court sought to reverse
the Committee's findings. Id. (Simon, J., dissenting). Simon conceded that this result
was absurd; however, he insisted that it was equally perverse to require Loss to bear the
burden. Id. (Simon, J., dissenting). See supra note 12 for a discussion of the standard of
proof in all disciplinary hearings.
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evidentiary burden prior to the hearing before the Committee. 60
In response to Justice Simon's widely publicized dissent which
evoked public criticism, 61 Justice Ryan added a special concurrence62 and cataloged the details of Loss's unsavory past.63 He also
countered Justice Simon's due process argument 6' and expressed
his concern with regard to Loss's application for admission. 65 Fi-

nally, Justice Ryan argued that irresponsible members of both the
media and the public condemned the majority for its decision.66
He maintained that the same group of people would have objected
just as vigorously if Loss had been admitted to the bar and then
had harmed the public.67
60. Loss, 119 Ill. 2d at 223, 518 N.E.2d at 997 (Simon, J., dissenting). Simon explained that without knowledge of the appropriate burden of proof, Loss lacked sufficient
notice of what he needed to show before the Committee. Id. (Simon, J., dissenting).
Therefore, the court failed to afford Loss an essential tenet of due process. Id. (Simon, J.,
dissenting).
61. See, e.g., Royko, Legally Speaking, Lawyers Don't Lie, Chicago Tribune, Sept. 3,
1987, at 3, col. 1; Royko, Let's Get to Bottom of Ed Loss Affair, Chicago Tribune, Aug.
20, 1987, at 3, col. 1; Royko, Because the Fix is in, Loss is Out, Chicago Tribune, Aug. 19,
1987 at 3, col. 1; Royko, High Court Misses the Point of Law, Chicago Tribune, Aug. 18,
1987, at 3, col. 1.
62. Loss, 119 Ill. 2d at 198, 518 N.E.2d at 986 (Ryan, J., concurring). Justice Ryan
explained that because Loss was invited to reapply in the original opinion filed, the majority thought it "inappropriate to unnecessarily besmirch his character by a detailed
recitation of his past conduct." Id. at 208, 518 N.E.2d at 990 (Ryan, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 208-18, 518 N.E.2d at 991-95 (Ryan, J., concurring). For example, on a
number of occasions Loss was arrested for possession of heroin, cocaine, and marijuana.
Id. at 210, 518 N.E.2d at 991 (Ryan, J., concurring). While in college he sold drugs, and
he was addicted to heroin by the time he graduated from college. Id. at 209-10, 518
N.E.2d at 991 (Ryan, J., concurring). He also was convicted of disorderly conduct twice.
Id. at 210, 518 N.E.2d at 991 (Ryan, J., concurring).
64. According to Ryan, Loss should have known that he was not entitled to admission solely on the basis of the Committee's certification because there were other requirements. Id. at 208, 518 N.E.2d at 990 (Ryan, J., concurring). For example, Rule 701(a)
requires, in part, that the applicant have passed the bar, that he is of good character and
fitness, and that he is at least 21 years old. ILL. S. CT. R. 701(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
I 10A, para. 701(a) (1987). In addition, Ryan asserted that all circumstances were considered; thus, no due process deprivation occurred. Loss, 119 Ill. 2d at 208, 518 N.E.2d
at 990 (Ryan, J., concurring).
65. After reviewing Loss's history, Justice Ryan concluded that Loss had a propensity for lying to further his own interests. Loss, 119 Ill. 2d at 214, 518 N.E.2d at 993
(Ryan, J., concurring). Justice Ryan also took cognizance of Loss's conduct as an adult.
Id. (Ryan, J., concurring). For example, until 1980 when Loss was 33 years old, he used
numerous aliases, and at 34 years of age, Loss lied on his law school application. Id.
(Ryan, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 218, 518 N.E.2d at 995 (Ryan, J., concurring). See supra note 61.
67. Loss, 119 Ill. 2d at 218, 518 N.E.2d at 995 (Ryan, J., concurring).
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THE DISCIPLINARY PROCESS

A.

Bench-Bar Relations

During the Survey period, the supreme court also reviewed the
conduct of seven lawyers who had loaned money that benefited a
judge. A violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 7-110(a) established the core of the court's review.6" In the first case to address
this issue, In re Corboy,69 the court imposed no sanction.7" In In re
Ketchum,7 I however, the court imposed a two-year suspension.72
In Corboy, the court addressed an issue of first impression; that
is, whether Rule 7-110(a) of the Code of Professional Responsibility was violated by attorneys who loaned at least $1000 to a presiding judge.73 Four attorneys,74 including Philip Corboy, each gave
lawyer Walter Ketchum checks for $1000 payable to Judge Richard LeFevour; the attorneys either believed the money was a charitable gift or a loan to the judge's ill mother.7 5 There was no
agreement drawn for repayment, no discussion of interest on the
loan, and no money was ever repaid. 6
A majority of both the Hearing and Review Boards found that
the four attorneys had violated Rule 7-110(a) of the Code of Professional Responsibility.77 Nevertheless, members of the Boards
disagreed as to the specific discipline that ought to be imposed. 78
The dispute centered around the rule's proper interpretation.
68. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 7-110(a) of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provided in part that "[a] lawyer shall not give or lend any thing of value to a judge...
except that a lawyer may make a contribution to the campaign fund of a candidate for
office." CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 7-110(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110A, CANON 7 (1987). The Rule has been amended. See infra note 106 for the text of
amended Rule 7-110(a).
69. 124 IlI. 2d 29, 528 N.E.2d 694 (1988) (per curiam).
70. Id. at 50, 528 N.E.2d at 703.
71. 124 Ill. 2d 50, 528 N.E.2d 689 (1988) (per curiam).
72. Id. at 61, 528 N.E.2d at 693.
73. Corboy, 124 Ill. 2d at 33, 528 N.E.2d at 695. See supra note 68.
74. The attorneys were Philip Corboy, William Maddux, William Harte, and James
Madler, and they were solicited by Walter Ketchum. Corboy, 124 Ill. 2d at 34, 528
N.E.2d at 696.
75. Id. at 35, 528 N.E.2d at 696. Two other attorneys, Samuel Banks and Patrick
Tuite, also loaned money to LeFevour without securing a note for repayment. Id. at 4748, 528 N.E.2d at 702. These attorneys were close personal family friends and lent the
money at LeFevour's request for the payment of LeFevour's taxes. Id. The court found
that both of these respondents expected to be repaid. Id. Both lawyers had cases pending
in the First Municipal District of the Circuit Court of Cook County, but neither had tried
cases before LeFevour. Id. at 47, 528 N.E.2d at 702.
76. Id. at 35, 528 N.E.2d at 696.
77. Id. at 36, 528 N.E.2d at 697.
78. Id.
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Members of the Board who interpreted Rule 7-110(a) as a per se
prohibition argued that the attorneys' intent was irrelevant and
that censure should be the discipline imposed.79 Opposing Board
members argued that the rule was not an absolute prohibition;
rather, the attorneys' intent was, in part, determinative of whether
a violation occurred. 0 The Board members who considered intent
argued that a reprimand should be imposed for a technical violation of the rule.8"
The court rejected both groups' theories; it refused to declare
Rule 7-110(a) to be a per se rule and it concluded that a violation of
the rule does not depend upon an attorney's intent or motive.82
The court explained that if a violation were to depend upon an
attorney's state of mind, the prophylactic effect of the rule would
be abrogated. 3 The rule aims to maintain an independent and unbiased judiciary and to eradicate even the appearance of impropriety.8 4 Because loans or gifts to judges, even if motivated by
charity, are likely to elicit suspicion of impropriety, motive is not
crucial when applying the rule.8 5 Furthermore, evidence of intent
generally is germane only to the determination of the type of sanction to be imposed.8 6
The court explained that in order to properly interpret the rule,
it must be read in conjunction with Rule 65(C)(4) of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.87 To conclude that a judge may accept that
which an attorney is prohibited from giving would be absurd; thus,
the court ruled that Rules 65(C)(4) and 7-110(a) are necessary
complements. 88 Rule 65(C)(4)(a)-(c) of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides for three exceptions to the general prohibition,89 and
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 39, 528 N.E.2d at 698.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 37-38, 528 N.E.2d at 697.
85. Id. at 39, 528 N.E.2d at 698. Also, the rule does not contain intent as a specific
element. Id. See supra note 68 for the text of Rule 7-110(a).
86. Corboy, 124 Ill. 2d at 39, 528 N.E.2d at 698 (citing In re Clayter, 78 Ill. 2d 276,
283, 399 N.E.2d 1318, 1321 (1980); In re Thompson, 30 Ill. 2d 560, 569, 198 N.E.2d 337,
342 (1963)).
87. Corboy, 124 Ill. 2d at 40, 528 N.E.2d at 699. Rule 65(C)(4) forbids a judge from
accepting a "gift, bequest, favor, or loan from anyone ....
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Rule 65(C)(4)(a)-(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, CANON 5 (1987).
88. Corboy, 124 Ill. 2d at 41, 528 N.E.2d at 699.
89. In part, Rule 65(C)(4)(a)-(c) states as follows:
(a) a judge may accept a gift incident to a public testimonial to him;... or an
invitation . . . to attend a bar-related function or activity devoted to the improvement of the law... (b) a judge... may accept ordinary social hospitality;
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Rule 7-110(a) of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
one exception. 9° These four exceptions combine to establish the
only circumstances under which an attorney may make a gift or
loan to a judge.9 '
Applying this newly enunciated standard, the court addressed
the two exceptions which arguably were applicable.92 These exceptions were "ordinary social hospitality" pursuant to Rule
65(c)(4)(b), and "a gift or loan from a lawyer not practicing before
or not likely to practice before the judge." 9a The court announced
an objective test to be used as the touchstone in determinations of
ordinary social hospitality. The test is a "careful consideration of
social custom," including the following four factors: "(1) the monetary value of the gift, (2) the relationship, if any, between the
judge and the donor/lender lawyer, (3) the social practices and
customs associated with gifts and loans, and (4) the particular circumstances surrounding the gifts and loans."' 94 In the instant case,

the court reasoned that the amount of each gift or loan was substantial and that some of the attorneys only had a tenuous acquaintance with the judge. 95 Furthermore, the court explained that the
sum of $1000 raised an appearance of impropriety regardless of
any altruistic motives that the attorneys may have held. 96 Consequently, the court ruled that these loans did not fall within the
purview of the "ordinary social hospitality" exception. 97
Addressing the issue of whether these loans or gifts were given
by attorneys "who practice or have practiced before the judge," 9s
the court declared that it would not liberally construe this exception in favor of donors. 99 The court interpreted Rule 65(C)(4)(c)
a bequest, favor, or loan from a relative; a wedding or engagement gift... (c) a
judge... may accept any other gift, bequest, favor, or loan, only if the donor is
not a party or other person whose interests have come or are likely to come
before him, including lawyers who practice or have practiced before the judge.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Rule 65(C)(4)(a)-(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, CANON 5
(1987).
90. Corboy, 124 Ill. 2d at 41, 528 N.E.2d at 699. See supra note 68 for the text of
Rule 7-110(a).
91. Corboy, 124 Ill. 2d at 41, 528 N.E.2d at 699.
92. Id. at 42, 528 N.E.2d at 700.
93. Id. (citing CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Rule 65(C)(4)(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
l10A, CANON 5 (1987)).
94. Id. at 42-43, 528 N.E.2d at 700.
95. Id. at 43, 528 N.E.2d at 700.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. (citing CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Rule 65(C)(4)(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110A, CANON 5 (1987)).
99. Id.

576

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 20

as follows: If an attorney's practice is the type which will bring
him into a court proceeding, the attorney is prohibited from loaning or giving anything to any judge who sits on that court. 10° In
addition, departmental distinctions at the circuit court level are irrelevant. 10 1 The court reasoned that judges are not "permanent
fixture[s] of any division, but [are] subject to reassignment by the
chief judge."1 1 2 In the instant case, the attorneys did in fact have
cases before the circuit court in which Judge LeFevour was the
presiding judge.103 Thus, the attorneys' conduct was not excused
pursuant to Rule 65(C)(4)(c). 1°0
Though the court held that the attorneys violated Rule 7-110(a),
it discharged respondents on the ground that they "acted without
the guidance of precedent or settled opinion." ' 5 Furthermore, the
court explained that it would have been "unfair to apply the limitations" that were undefined when the conduct in this case occurred. 10 6 Finally, the court briefly considered other mitigating
factors such as the attorneys' outstanding reputations, their charitable contributions, and their diligent work to improve the reputation of the legal profession. 07
In re Ketchum 108 involved an attorney whose friendship with
LeFevour was long-standing.'°9 Before LeFevour became a judge,
100. Id. This prohibition applies with equal force to the attorney's associates. Id. at
43-44, 528 N.E.2d at 700.
101. Id. at 44, 528 N.E.2d at 700. Examples of these distinctions are criminal, probate, and traffic divisions. Id.
102. Id. That Judge LeFevour was excused from hearing cases was not relevant because a gift to a presiding judge could appear to be more improper than a gift to a lower
judge. Id. In addition, there was no guarantee that Judge LeFevour would not be demoted or transferred. Id.
103. Id. Specifically, LeFevour presided in the Circuit Court of Cook County, First
Municipal District. Id.
104. Id. at 45, 528 N.E.2d at 701.
105. Id. But see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
106. Corboy, 124 Ill. 2d at 45, 528 N.E.2d at 701. Rule 7-110(a) as amended states:
(a) A lawyer shall not give or lend any thing of value to a judge . . . except
those gifts or loans which a judge ... may receive under Rule 65(c)(4) of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, except that a lawyer may make a contribution to the
campaign fund of a candidate for such office.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 7-110(a), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1 10A,
CANON 7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988). The amendment was effective as of the date of this
opinion, June 20, 1988. Corboy, 124 Ill. 2d at 46, 528 N.E.2d at 701. But see supra note
57 and accompanying text.
107. Corboy, 124 Ill. 2d at 46, 528 N.E.2d 701-02. The court applied the same rationale and arrived at the same conclusion with regard to Samuel Banks and Patrick Tuite
who had lent money to LeFevour for the payment of his taxes. Id. at 49-50, 528 N.E.2d
at 703. See supra note 75.
108. 124 Ill. 2d 50, 528 N.E.2d 689 (1988) (per curiam).
109. Id. at 52, 528 N.E.2d at 689. Ketchum and LeFevour also were neighbors. Id.
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Ketchum made occasional loans to him that were always repaid."'
After LeFevour became a judge, however, respondent extended at
least nine loans to him that totaled at least $9,300."' In addition,
when LeFevour requested a $10,000 "loan," respondent claimed
that he did not have the funds when in fact he did. 12 Instead of
producing the money himself, respondent offered to solicit $1,000
contributions from other attorneys." 3 In total, respondent collected $6,000 for LeFevour." 4
Ketchum was charged with violating Rule 7-110(a) of the Code
of Professional Responsibility." 5 The Hearing Board found that
Ketchum had violated the rule even though he lacked the intent to
influence Judge LeFevour. 116 The Review Board agreed that reRule 7-1 10(a) based on a per se interpretaspondent had violated
l7
tion of the rule."
The court emphasized that Ketchum's conduct violated Rule 7110(a) under any construction of the rule." 18 It further noted that
although there was no evidence the respondent received a direct
benefit from the loans in actual court cases, there was the "appearance of impropriety" ' 19 because 20% to 50% of Ketchum's cases
were tried in LeFevour's judicial district. 120 Finally, the court
ruled that Ketchum's repeated violations of the rule and his experience and knowledge of the rule's prohibition warranted a two-year
suspension. 121
110. Id. at 53, 528 N.E.2d at 690.
111. Id. at 55, 528 N.E.2d at 691.
112. Id. at 54, 528 N.E.2d at 690.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 54-55, 528 N.E.2d at 690. None of this money was secured by a note and
no agreement for repayment was ever drawn. Id. at 55, 528 N.E.2d at 690.
115. Id. See supra note 68 for the text of Rule 7-110(a).
116. Ketchum, 124 Ill. 2d at 56, 528 N.E.2d at 691. Consequently, the Board recommended censure. Id. It further noted that the respondent was an experienced attorney
who admitted to being aware of the rule's proscription; his relationship with LeFevour
was business-oriented as well as social; the respondent was not completely "candid and
forthright" with regard to all the facts; LeFevour never repaid the money and respondent
never attempted to collect the money owed. Id.
117. Id. The Review Board recommended a one-year suspension reasoning that the
respondent's conduct " 'was not an isolated incident' but a 'calculated, continuing wrong
and a blot upon our profession and our system of Justice.' " Id. at 57, 528 N.E.2d at 692.
118. Id. at 58, 528 N.E.2d at 692. In contrast, the court explained that the respondents in Corboy had not violated the unrevised version of Rule 7-110(a). Id. at 60-61, 528
N.E.2d at 693. See supra note 106 and accompanying text for the current text of Rule 7110(a).
119. Ketchum, 124 Ill. 2d at 59, 528 N.E.2d at 693.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 61, 528 N.E.2d at 693. Specifically, the court found that the evidence
supported a conclusion that the respondent intended to, and actually did, derive a benefit
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B. Mishandling of Client Funds and Property
During the Survey year, the supreme court issued six written
opinions involving the mishandling of client funds in violation of
Rule 9-102 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 9-102
requires an attorney to preserve the identity of the funds and property of a client.1 22 In fact, the Illinois Supreme Court, in In re
Clayter,123 admonished the Illinois bar that it was "absolutely impermissible for an attorney to commingle his funds with those of
his client or with money he holds as a fiduciary. "124 Nevertheless,
the imposition of sanctions in such cases varied from censure to
disbarment. 25 Justice Moran, in In re Grant, reviewed numerous
cases involving Rule 9-102 and concluded that inconsistent sanctions may be due to the acknowledgement of mitigating circumstances. 26 He also recognized an
"uneven and arbitrary
' 27
application of the mitigating factors.'
In each opinion issued during the Survey period, the court imposed a sanction. The maximum sanction imposed 2was
a three9
year suspension

2

and the minimum was a censure.

The respondent in In re Lewis 130 was charged with specific acts
of conversion as well as engaging in a four to five year pattern of
from the money loaned. Id. at 60, 528 N.E.2d at 693. In addition, the fact that the
frequency of the loans increased after LeFevour was made a presiding judge suggested
impropriety. Id. Furthermore, the solicitation of other lawyers for monetary contributions also constituted a violation of the rule. Id. at 59, 528 N.E.2d at 693.
122. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 9-102, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
1 10A, CANON 9 (1987). Rule 9-102(a) provides that:
All funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, including funds belonging in
part to a client and in part presently or potentially to the lawyer or law firm,
shall be deposited in one or more separate identifiable trust accounts in a bank
or savings and loan association maintained in the State in which the law office is
situated.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 9-102(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 0A,
CANON 9 (1987).
123. 78 Ill. 2d 276, 399 N.E.2d 1318 (1980).
124. Id. at 276, 399 N.E.2d at 1319. The court explained that commingling may
result in a conversion of client funds by operation of law because the funds are jeopardized by an attorney's possible insolvency or death. Id. at 281, 399 N.E.2d at 1321.
125. See In re Grant, 89 Ill. 2d 247, 255, 433 N.E.2d 259, 265 (1982) (Moran, J.,
dissenting).
126. Id. (Moran, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 257, 433 N.E.2d at 264 (Moran, J., dissenting). For example, the court
has inconsistently treated the following factors: Financial, emotional, or family
problems; restitution; the exemplary or poor prior record of the attorney; and a pattern of
commingling and conversion. Id. (Moran, J., dissenting).
128. In re Lewis, 118 Ill. 2d 357, 515 N.E.2d 96 (1987).
129. In re Walner, 119 111. 2d 511, 519 N.E.2d 903 (1988).
130. 118 Ill. 2d 357, 515 N.E.2d 96 (1987).
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converting client funds.' 3 ' In addition, the respondent admitted to
eleven situations in which he
converted and unreasonably delayed
3 2
remittance of client funds.'

Although the respondent argued that mere oversights due to
poor health caused his misconduct, both the Hearing and Review
Boards rejected this contention.' 3 3 The court agreed with both
Boards' factual findings. 34 Although respondent further argued
that he lacked dishonest motivation,' 35 the court held that even
absent an invidious
motive, the conversion of client funds is grave
36
misconduct.'

The court refused to impose a mere censure for repeated serious
37
violations even though the clients' funds had been returned.
Nevertheless, the court considered as mitigating factors the respondent's sincerity and contriteness in answering the charges, evidence
from practicing attorneys and judges as to his good reputation, and
respondent's significant contributions in pro3 9bono cases. 13 Thus,
the court imposed a three-year suspension.'
In In re Ushi/ima,14° the Hearing Board's finding that respondent had not converted client funds was reversed by the Review
Board. ' 4 ' The court found that respondent had substantially converted funds 4 2 and persistently failed to account for funds in es131. Id. at 359, 515 N.E.2d at 97.
132. Id. at 363, 515 N.E.2d at 98.
133. Id. at 361, 515 N.E.2d at 97. The Boards disagreed as to the appropriate sanction to be imposed. Id. at 360, 515 N.E.2d at 97. The Hearing Board recommended a
two-year suspension until further order of the court, whereas the Review Board recommended disbarment. Id.
134. Id. at 362, 515 N.E.2d at 98. The court agreed that respondent failed to establish the existence of an impairment which would excuse his misconduct. Id.
135. Id. at 361, 515 N.E.2d at 97. As proof of his honesty, respondent argued that
his clients did not suffer a monetary loss because they were reimbursed for their inability
to use the funds. Id.
136. Id. at 362, 515 N.E.2d at 98. The court stated that commingling jeopardizes
clients' funds by subjecting them to the attorney's creditors. Id. at 362-63, 515 N.E.2d at
98.
137. Id. at 364, 515 N.E.2d at 99.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 119 111. 2d 51, 518 N.E.2d 73 (1987).
141. Id. at 53, 518 N.E.2d at 74. In addition, the Review Board found that the respondent compounded the violation of converting client funds by giving false testimony
in order to conceal his misconduct. Id. The Hearing Board recommended censure and
the Review Board recommended a one-year suspension. Id. at 53-54, 518 N.E.2d at 74.
142. Id. at 56-57, 518 N.E.2d at 76. The court reversed the Review Board's finding
that respondent had concealed his misconduct; however, it upheld the Review Board's
finding that respondent had converted client's funds. Id.
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crow in spite of client requests. 14 3
As to the appropriate sanction, the court considered both mitigating and aggravating factors.'" As evidence of mitigation, the
court noted that practicing attorneys testified to his good reputation; this was the first instance of misconduct since respondent's
admission to the bar in 1966 and respondent was cooperative in the
disciplinary proceedings.' 45 On the other hand, respondent acknowledged his indifference toward his clients' interests and that
he had refused to make restitution to his clients because he was
angry with them. 146 Finally, respondent's attitude revealed a lack
of understanding as to the purpose of the disciplinary process.' 47
The court expressed concern for the public's protection from attorneys whose anger would cause them to disregard their professional
obligations.' 48 Therefore, the court ordered an eighteen-month
suspension. 4 9
In In re Solomon, 15 ° the Review Board affirmed the Hearing
Board's findings that respondent commingled the funds of one client, converted the funds of one client, and failed to render an accounting to three clients, thereby violating Rules 9-102(a),(b), and
(c)(3) of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 15' The respondent argued in mitigation that none of the three clients lost money
due to his conduct, his action was not motivated by dishonesty,
and he fully and candidly cooperated in the disciplinary proceeding.' 52 Nonetheless, the court found that respondent's testimony
143. Id. at 59, 518 N.E.2d at 77. Respondent's misconduct constituted violations of
Rules 9-102(c)(3) and (c)(4). Rule 9-102(c)(3) states in part that "a lawyer shall ...
render appropriate accounts to his client." CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Rule 9-102(c)(3), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, CANON 9 (1987). Rule 9-102(c)(4) provides
in part that "a lawyer shall promptly pay or deliver to the client, as requested by the
client, the funds... in the possession of the lawyer which the client is entitled to receive."
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 9-102(c)(4), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A,
CANON 9 (1987).
144. Ushijima, 119 Ill. 2d at 60, 518 N.E.2d at 77.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. The court found that respondent "portrayed himself as the victim of deadbeat clients" and that he held clients' escrow funds as "ransom in fee dispute[s]." Id.
149. Id.
150. 118 I11.
2d 286, 515 N.E.2d 52 (1987).
151. Id. at 292-93, 515 N.E.2d at 54-55. The Review Board also agreed with the
Hearing Board's recommendation of a nine-month suspension. Id. at 288, 515 N.E.2d at
52. Rule 9-102(b) provides that an attorney may withdraw funds owed to him from the
client's account only "after reasonable notice to the client of an intention to withdraw
.... "
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 9-102(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
ll0A, CANON 9 (1987).
152. Solomon, 118 Ill. 2d at 294, 515 N.E.2d at 55.
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manifested a deliberate disregard of his professional obligations. 15 3
Furthermore, respondent treated his desire to be reimbursed as
more important than his duties to his clients, and the court found
this completely unacceptable.154 Consequently, the court found
that the Boards' recommendations were amply supported by the
155
evidence, and it ordered a nine-month suspension.
The respondent in In re Freiman 156 deposited client funds into a
"special funds account" from which he later withdrew money to
fulfill his personal obligations.' 5 1 One year after the client's money
was deposited, the client tried to cash respondent's settlement
check. The check was dishonored.' 58 Eventually, respondent reimbursed his client with interest.15 9
Although the respondent argued that his conduct was not intentional, the court noted that intent is usually inferred from the circumstances." 6° The Review Board found, and the court affirmed,
that the respondent knew there were insufficient funds in the client's fund account. 16 ' The court acknowledged two mitigating factors: testimony of respondent's good character, and the Hearing
Board's finding that this was respondent's first instance of misconduct.' 6 2 Nevertheless, the court expressed a concern over the cli63
ent's loss from the delay she experienced in receiving her money. 1
Consequently, the court concluded that the client was
prejudiced" 6 and it ordered a four-month suspension. 16 5
In In re Trezise, 166 the respondent mishandled a client's property
153. Id. at 296, 515 N.E.2d at 56. Respondent's testimony established that he knew
he had a duty to render a formal accounting regardless of a client's request, and independent of any dispute over the funds as legal fees, to account for all settlement proceeds. Id.
154. Id. at 297, 515 N.E.2d at 56-57.
155. Id. at 297, 515 N.E.2d at 57.
156. 118 Ill. 2d 341, 515 N.E.2d 78 (1987).
157. Id. at 342, 515 N.E.2d at 78.
158. Id.
159. Id. Restitution was not made until after the client filed charges with the ARDC.
Id.
160. Id. at 344, 515 N.E.2d at 79.
161. Id. at 344-45, 515 N.E.2d at 79. The Review Board reversed the Hearing
Board's finding that the conversion had not been intentional. Id. at 344, 515 N.E.2d at
79. The Hearing Board recommended censure; the Review Board recommended a oneyear suspension. Id. at 342, 515 N.E.2d at 78.
162. Id. at 344, 515 N.E.2d at 79.
163. Id. at 345, 515 N.E.2d at 80.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. 118 Ill. 2d 346, 515 N.E.2d 80 (1987).
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by executing a trustee's deed in violation of a court order. 167 He
also conveyed property which he held for the benefit of the client
while a citation order prohibiting the client from transferring the
property was in effect.' 6 The Hearing Board found, and the Review Board affirmed, that respondent acted with an almost com169
plete indifference toward the transaction.
7
Respondent argued that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 772, 1
which provides for probation, should have been applied because he
was suffering from emotional distress.' 7' Although respondent
conceded that Rule 772 was adopted pursuant to decisions which
involved alcoholic attorneys, he argued that the scope should be
72
broadened to cover attorneys suffering from emotional distress.
Noting that the nature of the practice of law is itself stressful, the
73
court refused to broaden the scope of the rule.
When deciding the appropriate discipline to impose, the court
noted that the respondent acted carelessly in transferring his client's property. '7' Furthermore, the court found that respondent
7
failed to perceive the importance of the disciplinary proceedings. 1
Finally, this particular misconduct occurred only seven months after the respondent had been censured by the court for a separate
matter.176 Consequently, the court ordered a nine-month
167. Id. at 347, 515 N.E.2d at 80.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 347, 515 N.E.2d at 80-81. Neither Board found that the respondent intended to defraud the client. Because the respondent failed to answer the Administrator's
complaint within the appropriate time pursuant to ILL. S. CT. R. 231, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 110A, para. 231 (1987), the Administrator moved to have all allegations in the complaint admitted. Trezise, 118 Ill. 2d at 351, 515 N.E.2d at 82. The Hearing Board
granted the motion, but it did not admit the allegations pertaining to code violations. Id.
170. ILL. S. CT. R. 772, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10A, para. 772 (1987). Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 772 provides for the imposition of probation when an attorney demonstrates the following: (1) his continued practice of law will not cause the disrepute of
either the profession or the courts; (2) during his rehabilitation period he is unlikely to
harm the public and his probation can be adequately supervised; (3) "his disability [is]
temporary or minor and does not require treatment and transfer to inactive status"; and
(4) his misconduct does not warrant disbarment. Id.
171. Trezise, 118 I11. 2d at 354, 515 N.E.2d at 84.
172. Id. at 355, 515 N.E.2d at 84.
173. Id. Notwithstanding this refusal, the court ruled that respondent had failed to
carry his burden of proving such a disability. Id. The court noted that respondent failed
to show evidence of both a specific condition from which he was suffering and treatment
by a therapist who allegedly was treating him. Id. at 353, 515 N.E.2d at 83.
174. Id. at 357, 515 N.E.2d at 85.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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C. Scope of Attorney-Client Relations
Although the scope of attorney-client relations is not defined in
the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility,1 8 one case filed
during the Survey year directly dealt with the principle that clients
have the ultimate authority to determine the purpose to be served
by that relationship. In In re Walner,'7 9 the respondent was cen-

sured for settling a client's personal injury claim without consent
and for signing a client's name without authority. 80 Furthermore,
he withdrew attorney's fees without notifying clients in violation of
Rule 9-102(b);' 8 1 he failed to provide a closing statement as mandated by Rule 2-106(c)(3);18 2 he was dilatory in notifying a client of
83
a settlement; and he failed to promptly remit funds to the client. 1
The court reviewed respondent's dealings with two different cli177. Id. The Hearing Board had recommended probation; however, the Review
Board recommended a six-month suspension. Id. at 347, 515 N.E.2d at 80-81.
178. Cf MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1.2 (Discussion
Draft 1983). This rule, which is entitled "Scope of Representation" and which has no
counterpart in the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility, provides that a lawyer
shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation and the
means by which they are to be pursued. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1.2(a) (Discussion Draft 1983). Rule 1.2(a) also provides that lawyers shall
abide by a client's decision as to whether an offer of settlement should be accepted. Id.
Illinois law states that lawyers shall not intentionally fail to seek the lawful objectives of a
client through reasonable means permitted by law. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 7-101(a)(1), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, CANON 7 (1987). In addition, Rule
5-106(a) provides that lawyers representing two or more clients shall not participate in the
making of an aggregate settlement of the claims absent the consent of each client. CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 5-106(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, CANON 5
(1987) (emphasis added).
179. 119 Ill. 2d 511, 519 N.E.2d 903 (1988).
180. Id. at 525, 519 N.E.2d at 909. The Hearing Board found misconduct only in
one case and it recommended censure. Id. at 513, 519 N.E.2d at 903. The Review Board
found misconduct in both cases and recommended a one-year suspension. Id.
181. Id. at 522, 524, 519 N.E.2d at 908. See supra note 151 wherein Rule 9-102(b) is
paraphrased.
182. Walner, 119 Ill. 2d at 521, 519 N.E.2d at 907. The rule provides in part that
"[o]ne copy of the closing statement signed by the lawyer shall be provided to each party
represented by him within a reasonable time after receipt by the lawyer of any sum or
sums to which the contingent-fee agreement is applicable." CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY Rule 2-106(c)(3), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, CANON 2 (1987).
183. Walner, 519 Ill. 2d at 521, 519 N.E.2d at 907. Rule 9-102(c)(1) requires a lawyer to "promptly notify a client of the receipt of his funds .. " CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY Rule 9-102(c)(1), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, CANON 9 (1987). Rule 9102(c)(4) requires promptness in the delivery of client funds in the attorney's possession.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 9-102(c)(4), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A,
CANON 9 (1987).
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ents. I 4 In each instance, the respondent had settled personal injury claims for clients who could not be located at the time the
settlements were negotiated.1" 5 In one case, respondent agreed
with the client at the time of retention that no settlement would be
made without the consent of the client.1 8 6 In another case, respondent originally had his client sign a retention agreement
wherein
18 7
the client granted the firm a general power of attorney.
The court explained that when the express terms of an attorneyclient agreement specify client authorization, an attorney's belief to
the contrary will not suffice to escape discipline.18 8 Moreover, respondent's claim that one client had permission to authorize a settlement for all was not supported by the evidence.' 8 9 The court
noted that suspicious circumstances surrounded the execution of
the settlement.190 The court concluded that despite the "substantial risk of harm" caused by respondent's misconduct, there was no
evidence of prejudice to his clients. '1
The court also stated that there was no evidence of dishonest
motivation, that the conduct apparently resulted from a "misguided sense of efficiency and was apparently designed to accommodate clients who were difficult to reach," and that this was the
first- formal complaint against respondent. 92 The court declared
that "absent clear evidence of dishonest motive or economic harm
to his clients or others,"' 93 censure is the appropriate sanction. 94
D. Neglect
Neglect of a client's interests directly contravenes the mandates
95
of Canons 6 and 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.1
184. Walner, 119 Ill. 2d at 512-13, 519 N.E.2d at 903-04.
185. Id. at 522-23, 519 N.E.2d at 908.
186. Id. at 513, 519 N.E.2d at 904.
187. Id. at 516, 519 N.E.2d at 905.
188. Id. at 521, 519 N.E.2d at 907.
189. Id. at 520-21, 519 N.E.2d at 907.
190. Id. at 521, 519 N.E.2d at 907. The circumstances were "simulated signatures,
false notarization, and failure to indicate that the signatures were made in a representative capacity." Id.
191. Id. at 525, 519 N.E.2d at 909.
192. Id. Respondent had been in practice for 23 years at the time of this misconduct.

Id.
193.
194.
195.

Id. (citing In re Levy, 115 Ill. 2d 395, 504 N.E.2d 107 (1987)).
Id.
Rule 6-101(a)(3) commands a lawyer to not "neglect a legal matter entrusted to

him." CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 6-101(a)(3), ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110A, CANON 6 (1987). Canon 7 requires all lawyers to "zealously" represent clients

within the bounds of the law. CODE OF
REV. STAT. ch. 1 A, CANON 7 (1987).

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY CANON 7, ILL.
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During the Survey year, the supreme court issued four opinions
reviewing attorneys charged with neglect of clients' interests.' 96
The resolution of these cases varied from dismissal of the complaint' 97 to disbarment.' 98
The conduct which gave rise to the charges against respondent
in In re Mason 199 resulted from respondent's failure to file a notice
of claim ,as required by statute in all personal injury suits filed
against the Chicago Transit Authority ("CTA"). 2°° Respondent
compounded this misconduct with an attempt to conceal the error
from his client.20 '
Based on the entire record, both the Hearing and Review Boards
found that respondent was not negligent, therefore warranting discipline.2 °2 Nevertheless, the Boards found that respondent's attempt to conceal his error constituted misconduct. 20 3 The court
affirmed the Boards' decisions as to the issue of negligence. 2° It

warned, however, that its failure to find negligence in a disciplinary
hearing does not foreclose the possibility that the conduct is suffi20 5
ciently negligent to prove an element in a malpractice suit.

Despite the finding of no negligence, the court affirmed the
Boards' findings with regard to respondent's concealment of his
error. 20 6 As to the appropriate sanction, the court considered a
number of factors: first, respondent was inexperienced, the notice
requirement was not widely known, and respondent was not noti196. Rule 7-101(2) states in part: "[a] lawyer shall not intentionally fail to carry out
a contract of employment entered into with a client for professional service .... CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 7-101(2), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 A, CANON 7
(1987). Also, Rule 7-101(3) states in part: "[a] lawyer shall not intentionally prejudice or
damage his client during the course of the professional relationship ....... CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 7-101(3), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 A, CANON 7
(1987).
197. In re Harris, 118 Ill. 2d 117, 514 N.E.2d 462 (1987).
198. In re Levin, 118 Ill. 2d 77, 514 N.E.2d 174 (1987).
199. 122 Ill. 2d 163, 522 N.E.2d 1233 (1988).
200. Id. at 164, 522 N.E.2d at 1234. This conduct gave rise to the charge of neglect
in violation of Rule 6-101(a)(3) of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Id.
201. Id. at 165, 522 N.E.2d at 1234. This conduct gave rise to charges of misconduct
for respondent's attempt to limit liability for malpractice in violation of Rule 6-102(a)
and misconduct constituting fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and misrepresentation in violation
of Rule 1-102(a)(4) of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Id.
202. Id. at 169, 522 N.E.2d at 1236.
203. Id. at 165, 522 N.E.2d at 1234. The Hearing and Review Boards agreed in
recommending censure as the appropriate sanction. Id.
204. Id. at 169, 522 N.E.2d at 1236.
205. Id. A malpractice suit would not be estopped by this disciplinary decision because disciplinary proceedings and malpractice suits seek different objectives. Id.
206. Id. at 170, 522 N.E.2d at 1236. The court regarded this attempt as "reprehensible." Id.
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fled by the CTA of the requirement; 20 7 second, the client's claim
was dubious; 208 and third, although respondent's acknowledgement
of his scheme before the Hearing Board was not a mitigating factor, it nevertheless deserved consideration in light of disciplinary
objectives.2 ° 9 Consequently, the court ordered the respondent
censured.21 °
2 1 ' was charged with misrepresenThe respondent in In re Harris
tation and the failure to discharge professional obligations in an
expeditious manner.212 Respondent failed to appear when the
Hearing Board convened, and when contacted by phone he admitted all facts encompassed by the complaint.21 3 The Hearing Board
concluded that respondent was guilty of both neglect and misrepresentation.21 4 Although respondent filed exceptions with the Review Board and submitted affidavits from both of his clients who
acknowledged their satisfaction with him, the Review Board
adopted the Hearing Board's conclusions.21 5
Basing its conclusion on two facts, the court ruled that respondent was not guilty of neglect or delay. 2 6 First, the court observed
21 7
that respondent's clients had not filed charges with the ARDC.
Second, no evidence as to the content of the attorney-client agreement was presented.21 8 Addressing the issue of whether respon207. Id. But see In re Cheronis, 114 Ill. 2d 527, 535, 502 N.E.2d 722, 726 (1986)
(ignorance of the law was no excuse for attorney error).
208. Mason, 122 Ill. 2d at 171, 522 N.E.2d at 1237.
209. Id. at 173, 522 N.E.2d at 1238.
210. Id. at 175, 522 N.E.2d at 1239.
211. 118 Ill. 2d 117, 514 N.E.2d 462 (1987).
212. Id. at 119, 514 N.E.2d at 463. The misrepresentation charge was based on respondent's repeated assertions to the Administrator that his client's case would be concluded in "short order." Id.
213. Id. at 120, 514 N.E.2d at 463. Respondent suggested that the Board decide the
case without him. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 120-21, 514 N.E.2d at 463-64. As a result of its findings, the Hearing
Board recommended a 90-day suspension with which the Review Board concurred. Id.
at 121, 514 N.E.2d at 463-64.
216. Id. at 118, 514 N.E.2d at 462.
217. Id. The clients' niece filed charges with the ARDC. Id.
218. Id. at 121-22, 514 N.E.2d at 464. There was no need for the Administrator to
produce evidence in support of his allegations because respondent admitted to the Administrator's allegations and the Hearing Board required no such proof. ILL. S. CT. R.
236(1), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 236(1) (1987). Furthermore, pursuant to Rule
753(e)(3), the Review Board's capacity to alter the Hearing Board's decision is limited to
situations in which the Hearing Board's decision is not supported by clear and convincing
evidence. ILL. S. CT. R. 753(e)(3), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 753 (e)(3) (1987).
The Review Board is also limited to the same standard when making supplementary
findings. Id.
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dent was guilty of misrepresentation, the court concluded that the
Administrator failed to show "deceptive intent."2 19 The court explained that respondent's letters to the Administrator did not concern past events, rather they were "clearly puffed expectations that
should have been understood as such. ' 220 Finally, the court observed that respondent's two partners died during the time he was
representing the clients in question, that these deaths indicated respondent was left with an increased work load, and that this factor
should have been considered.221 Consequently, the court ordered
dismissal of the complaint.222
In re Weinberg223 involved the neglect of a criminal appeal. The
respondent, attorney of record on the appeal, delegated the responsibility of writing a brief to an inexperienced attorney. 224 Although
respondent periodically checked on the progress of the brief, the
attorney failed to file it.225 After several extensions the appellate
court dismissed the appeal.226
Respondent was charged with neglect, failing to carry out a contract of employment, failing to represent a client zealously, and
prejudicing a client.227 The Hearing Board found, and the Review
Board affirmed, that the Administrator proved all of the charges.228
Respondent only argued the issue of discipline before the court; he
2d at 123, 514 N.E.2d at 465.
219. Harris, 118 I11.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 124, 514 N.E.2d at 465.
222. Id.
119 Ill. 2d 309, 518 N.E.2d 1037 (1988).
223.
224. Id. at 312, 518 N.E.2d at 1039. The court noted that the attorney to whom the
writing of the brief was delegated had been admitted to the bar shortly before he assumed
this responsibility. Id. at 315, 518 N.E.2d at 1040.
225. Id. at 312, 518 N.E.2d at 1039.
226. Id. Restitution was not an issue because the respondent did not receive a fee.
Id.
227. Id. at 313, 518 N.E.2d at 1039. These charges represented alleged violations of
the CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 6-101, ILL REV. STAT. ch. 1 0A,
CANON 6 (1987), and CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 7-101, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. I10A, CANON 7 (1987). See supra notes 195-96 for the text of these rules.
228.
Weinberg, 119 Ill. 2d at 313, 518 N.E.2d at 1039. In fact, the respondent acknowledged that it was his responsibility to ensure that a competent brief was timely
filed. Id. Recently, the court has received a proposed Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility. Proposed Rule 1-104, entitled "Responsibility of a Lawyer," provides for
the situation at issue in this case. The rule requires a lawyer who functions as a supervisor over another lawyer to "make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer's
conduct conforms to [the] Code." ILLINOIS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIfY
Rule 1-104(b) (proposed 1987). The rule also states that "[a] lawyer shall be responsible
for another lawyer's violation of this Code if... the lawyer... has direct supervisory
authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action." ILLINOIS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1-104(c)(2) (proposed 1987).
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did not take exception to the Boards' findings.2 29
With regard to the appropriate discipline to impose, the court
asserted that in criminal cases more severe discipline is appropriate
to deter neglect because the potential for non-compensable loss is
great. 230 Nevertheless, the court noted respondent had practiced
mainly in the area criminal law since 1967, this was the first disciplinary action against him, that he was not motivated by dishonesty or fraud, and that his client suffered no permanent harm
because the case was later reinstated and decided on the merits.231
Therefore, the court ordered the respondent censured.232
The misconduct at issue in In re Fox 233 also was neglect of criminal appeals;234 specifically, with regard to three clients who paid
the respondent a retainer, the respondent failed to pursue criminal
appeals properly. 235 The Hearing and Review Boards found respondent guilty of all counts charged against him.236
In response to the Review Board's recommendations, the respondent argued that factors which mitigated his misconduct
should be considered by the court.2 37 The court, however, reasoned that greater discipline was warranted because respondent's
misconduct caused his clients to forfeit constitutional guarantees.238 In addition, the court recognized serious aggravating conduct.2 39 It therefore adopted the Review Board's recommendation
229. Weinberg, 119 Il. 2d at 313, 518 N.E.2d at 1039. The Hearing Board recommended a 90-day suspension and the Review Board recommended censure. Id. at 310-11,
518 N.E.2d at 1038.
230. Id. at 314-15, 518 N.E.2d at 1040 (citing In re Hall, 95 111. 2d 371, 375, 447
N.E.2d 805, 806 (1983)).
231. Id. at 315, 518 N.E.2d at 1040.
232. Id. at 316, 518 N.E.2d at 1040.
233. 122 Ill. 2d 402, 522 N.E.2d 1229 (1988).
234. Respondent was charged with neglect of legal matters entrusted to him, failure
to seek the lawful objective of his client, failure to execute contracts of employment, and
prejudice or damage to his client. Id. at 404, 522 N.E.2d at 1230.
235. Id. at 404-05, 522 N.E.2d at 1230. Also, with respect to one client, respondent
did not refund a $1500 fee. Id. at 407, 522 N.E.2d at 1231.
236. Id. at 405, 522 N.E.2d at 1230. Although the Hearing Board recommended
censure, a majority of the Review Board recommended an 18-month suspension. Id.
237. Id. at 405-06, 522 N.E.2d at 1231. The factors he asserted were as follows:
respondent had never before been disciplined; he suffered from an aggravated hearing
condition; his marriage of 20 years was in the process of being dissolved; his association
with another attorney was in the midst of a break up; and he voluntarily returned a fee
paid to him by one client's family, including $100 more than the record indicated was
due. Id.
238. Id. at 409, 522 N.E.2d at 1232-33.
239. Namely, the respondent had misrepresented his actions by informing a client's
family that a brief had been filed when he knew that it had not. Id. at 410, 522 N.E.2d at
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and ordered an eighteen-month suspension. 240
Due to numerous aggravating factors and prior unrelated misconduct, the court ordered disbarment in In re Levin. 24 ' Respondent was charged with neglect of three criminal appeals, making
misrepresentations to clients, and commingling and converting a
client's fund. 242 Respondent failed to answer the charges; thus, the
Hearing Board ordered admission of all allegations in the
complaint.243
The court took cognizance of a prior suspension of the respondent, 2 " his conversion of a bond check's proceeds, 245 and his contempt for both the disciplinary process and the court.246
Consequently, the court ordered the respondent disbarred.247
E. Fraud and the Unauthorized Practiceof Law
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility directs lawyers to assist in the maintenance of the integrity and competence of
the legal profession. 248 Rule 3-101(a) of the Code prohibits a lawyer from assisting the unauthorized practice of law. 249 During the
Survey year, the supreme court issued one published opinion reviewing charges of fraud and assistance in the unauthorized practice of law.250
1233. Also, he returned money to only one client after charges were filed against him.
Id.
240. Id. at 411, 522 N.E.2d at 1233.
241. 118 Ill. 2d 77, 89, 514 N.E.2d 174, 180 (1987).
242. Id. at 78, 514 N.E.2d at 175.
243. Id. Furthermore, respondent did not comply with the Hearing Board's order to
file written closing arguments. Id. Because the respondent did not file objections with
the Review Board, the Hearing Board's report was submitted to the court as an agreed
matter pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 753(e)(1). Id. at 79, 514 N.E.2d at 175. Respondent also failed to comply with the court's briefing schedule. Id.
244. Id. at 88, 514 N.E.2d at 179. The court stated that the reason for suspension in
the prior instance of misconduct was due to the mitigating factor of alcoholism. In the
instance case, there was no evidence of any mitigating factors. Id.
245. Id. The court further declared that "[elven a single act of conversion may warrant disbarment." Id. at 88, 514 N.E.2d at 180 (citing In re Pass, 105 Ill. 2d 366, 370,
475 N.E.2d 525, 527 (1985)).
246. Id. at 89, 514 N.E.2d at 180. The court specifically noted that respondent "impeded the Commission's efforts to investigate the charges against him at the inquiry
stage," and when he finally submitted evidence before the court, it was "wholly inadequate." Id.
247. Id.
248. See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1-101, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
l10A, CANON 1 (1987).
249. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 3-101(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110A, CANON 3 (1987).
250. In re Yamaguchi, 118 Ill. 2d 417, 515 N.E.2d 1235 (1987). Rule 1-102(a)(4)
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In In re Yamaguchi,2" 5 ' the Hearing Board found that respondent
signed several blank real estate valuation complaints and gave
them to a non-lawyer friend who used them in tax board proceedings within which respondent did not participate. 2 Respondent
also allowed another non-lawyer to sign his name to these types of
complaints. 25 3 The court adopted the Hearing Board's factual find-

ings, 254 but before it imposed discipline it considered mitigating circumstances.2 565
2
suspension. 1

Consequently, the court ordered a six-month

F.

Conflict of Interest

Two opinions issued during the Survey year addressed the
precepts of Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Rule 5-101 declares that a lawyer should refuse employment when
his independent judgment may be impaired by his interests. 7 In
both cases the misconduct warranted suspension.
The respondent in In re Rosin 25 8 was charged with five violations of Canon 5 of the Code. 2 9 The Hearing Board found that
declares that "a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation .... ." CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1-102(a)(4),
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, CANON 1 (1987). Furthermore, the aiding of a non-lawyer in
the unauthorized practice of law violates Rule 3-101(a) of the code. Yamaguchi, 118 Ill.
2d at 420, 515 N.E.2d at 1236.
251. 118 Ill. 2d 417, 515 N.E.2d 1235 (1987).
252. Id. at 424, 515 N.E.2d at 1238.
253. Id. Although the Administrator sought disbarment, the Hearing Board recommended a reprimand and the Review Board recommended a six-month suspension. Id. at
420-21, 515 N.E.2d at 1236.
254. Id. at 424, 515 N.E.2d at 1238.
255. Id. at 428, 515 N.E.2d at 1240. The court noted that in over 40 years, this was
the first action for dishonesty against respondent. Id. Also, respondent did not intend to
profit or cause harm from his misconduct, and he did not actually profit or cause harm.
Id.
256. Id. at 429, 515 N.E.2d at 1240.
257. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 5-101, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110A, CANON 5 (1987).

258. 118 111. 2d 365, 515 N.E.2d 85 (1987).
259. Id. at 367, 515 N.E.2d at 86. Although there were several charges pending
against the respondent, only the material violations of Canon 5 will be discussed for purposes of the Survey. The violations alleged in count one were as follows: (1) the respondent violated Rule 5-101 because he undertook employment which could have been
influenced by his personal judgment; (2) that respondent violated Rule 5-107 because he
failed to avoid the influence from people other than the client; (3) that respondent violated Rule 5-107(a) because he did not represent his client with undivided fidelity; and
(4) that respondent violated Rule 5-104 by not limiting his business relations with his
client. Id.
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respondent was guilty of all violations of Canon 5.21 The Review
Board, however, dismissed the complaint.26 1
The court found that the respondent influenced his client into
investing $100,000 in a collector's stamp company which was controlled by a close friend of respondent's who was also a circuit
court judge in Cook County.26 2 Without investigating the company, respondent assured his client that the investment was a good
one, and he persuaded her to sign the investment agreement.263
Moreover, respondent did not provide his client with adequate se264
curity against lOSS.
The court emphasized that Rule 5-101(a) does not require an
actual compromise; the rule will be violated even in instances
where an attorney's professional judgment "will or reasonably may
be affected ... by his personal interests. ' 265 Thus, the court ruled
that even if respondent had competently executed the investment
agreement, he still would not have been protected from discipline.266 Before ordering discipline, the court considered both mitigating and aggravating factors.267 Considering the totality of the
circumstances, the court ordered a two-year suspension.268
The most serious charge levied against respondent in In re
260.

Id. Consequently, the Hearing Board recommended a three-month suspension.

Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 383-84, 515 N.E.2d at 94. Respondent's client had "severe psychological
problems... was diagnosed a schizophrenic," and only had an eleventh grade education.
Id. at 370, 515 N.E.2d at 87.
263. Id. at 381, 515 N.E.2d at 92-93.
264. Id. at 382, 515 N.E.2d at 93.
265. Id. at 381, 515 N.E.2d at 93 (emphasis in original). Rule 5-101(a) states
"[e]xcept with the consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept
employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or
reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, property, or personal interest."
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 5-101(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A,
CANON 5 (1987).
266. Rosin, 118 Ill. 2d at 381, 515 N.E.2d at 93. The court held that by failing to
make full disclosure to his client and by failing to obtain his client's informed consent,
respondent violated Rule 5-101(a). Id. The court also concluded that respondent's actions evidenced an intentional prejudice and damage to his client's interests. Id. at 383,
515 N.E.2d at 93-94.
267. Id. at 387, 515 N.E.2d at 95. For example, respondent reaped no personal benefit from his misconduct, he did not intend to defraud his client, and he had no prior
record of professional misconduct. Id. On the other hand, respondent divided fees with
an attorney who had solicited the client's case. Id. at 388, 515 N.E.2d at 96. In addition,
respondent personally lent $60,000 to Chambers Stamp Company which was controlled
by a judge. Id.
268. Id. at 389, 515 N.E.2d at 96. The two-year suspension was conditioned upon
respondent's making full restitution to his client within 60 days. Id. at 388-89, 515
N.E.2d at 95-96.
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Gordon 269 was also that respondent violated Rule 5-101(a) by undertaking employment which could have been affected by his personal judgment. 270 Respondent 271
made an unauthorized loan out of
an estate which he represented.
The Hearing Board found, and the Review Board affirmed, that
respondent was guilty of the charge.272 Addressing only the issue
of the appropriate sanction to be imposed,273 the court noted that
respondent voluntarily brought his misconduct to the ARDC's attention,274 he fully cooperated in the investigatory proceedings, he
made full restitution before the proceedings were instituted, this
was his first instance of misconduct, and he was active in pro bono
programs and charities.275 Consequently, the court ordered an
eighteen-month suspension.276
G. Violations of the Criminal Code
Violations of the criminal code are addressed by Supreme Court
Rule 76 1.277 When an attorney is convicted of a crime involving
fraud or moral turpitude, the Administrator is required to file a
petition with the court which prays for a suspension.278 Pursuant
to Rule 761(f), proof of conviction is conclusive evidence of the
n offcie
o involv
nov
attorney's guilt of the crime. 279 Convictions
crimes not
ing moral turpitude or fraud are referred by the Administrator to
the Inquiry Board. 2 0 During the Survey year, the supreme court
issued three published opinions which involved attorneys who had
violated the criminal code. Only in one case did the crime involve
moral turpitude.28 '
In In re Ciardelli, the respondent was a criminal defense attor269. 122 I11.2d 540, 524 N.E.2d 547 (1988).
270. Id. at 544, 524 N.E.2d at 549. See supra note 265 for the text of Rule 5-101(a).
271. Gordon, 122 Ill. 2d at 542, 524 N.E.2d at 548. Respondent was also charged
with filing a false and misleading account of the estate in the probate division of the
circuit court. Id.
272. Id. at 545, 524 N.E.2d at 549. The Boards also found that respondent was guilty
of a misrepresentation charge. The Hearing Board recommended a two-year suspension
with which the Review Board concurred. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 546, 524 N.E.2d at 550. Actually, respondent told his law partners of his
misconduct and his partners brought the matter to the ARDC's attention. Id. at 543-44,
524 N.E.2d at 549.
275. Id. at 546, 524 N.E.2d at 550.
276. Id.
277. ILL. S. CT. R. 761, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 761 (1987).
278. ILL. S. CT. R. 761(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 761(b) (1987).
279. ILL. S. CT. R. 761(f), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 761(f) (1987).
280. ILL. S. CT. R. 76 1(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 OA, para. 76 1(c) (1987).
281. In re Ciardelli, 118 Ill. 2d 233, 514 N.E.2d 1006 (1987).
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ney who was convicted of harboring and concealing a fugitive and
plotting to defraud a United States agency.2 2 He was suspended
by the court for a period of three years.283
Ruling on the question of discipline,284 the court stated that
notwithstanding the conclusive evidence of conviction, the court is
not precluded from examining other evidence for the purpose of
determining the severity of the discipline to be imposed. 285 It reasoned that discipline is warranted because of the conduct, not the
conviction.28 6
Although the court was concerned with the severely damaging
effect that this type of reprehensible conduct has on the public's
image of the legal profession, it did not disbar the respondent because of several mitigating factors.28 7 Consequently, the court ordered a three-year suspension.28 8
The respondent in In re Rolley28 9 was convicted of intentionally
failing to file an Illinois income tax return. 29 0 Respondent also was
charged with other violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility, one of which was commingling and conversion of client
funds."' The Hearing and Review Boards found respondent guilty
of conflicting business transactions which amounted to overreaching and self-dealing.292
282. Id. at 238, 514 N.E.2d at 1008-09.
283. Id. at 244, 514 N.E.2d at 1011. The suspension was applied retroactively to
February 4, 1986, the date that the interim suspension was ordered by the court. Id. at
235-36, 514 N.E.2d at 1007-08. On that date, based on his conviction, respondent was
suspended until further order of the court. Id. at 235, 514 N.E.2d at 1007.
284. After making findings of fact and law, the Hearing Board recommended a threeyear suspension from February 4, 1986. Id. at 236, 514 N.E.2d at 1008. The Review
Board affirmed the Hearing Board's findings of fact and law, but it recommended a oneyear suspension from February 3, 1986. Id.
285. Id. at 239, 514 N.E.2d at 1009.
286. Id. (citing In re Scott, 98 Ill. 2d 9, 16, 455 N.E.2d 81, 84 (1983); In re Andros,
64 Ill. 2d 419, 423-24, 356 N.E.2d 513, 514 (1976); In re Crane, 23 Ill. 2d 398, 400, 178
N.E.2d 349, 350 (1961)).
287. Id. at 243, 514 N.E.2d at 1011. For example, respondent had never before been
charged with professional misconduct, and he had been active in the bar association, pro
bono programs, his church, and several charities. Id. at 243-44, 514 N.E.2d at 1011.
Also, respondent had been a panelist on the federal court's pro bono criminal defense
program and there was testimony from attorneys and judges as to his good character. Id.
at 243, 514 N.E.2d at 1011.
288. Id. at 244, 514 N.E.2d at 1011.
289. 121 Ill. 2d 222, 520 N.E.2d 302 (1988).
290. Id. at 230, 520 N.E.2d at 306.
291. Id. at 227, 520 N.E.2d at 304.
292. Id. at 228, 520 N.E.2d at 304. The Hearing Board recommended a two-year
suspension. Id. at 225, 520 N.E.2d at 303. The Review Board members were in disagreement as to the appropriate sanction to be recommended. Id. A majority of five members
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The court ruled that absent extraordinary mitigating circumstances, a conviction for failing to file an income tax return is
grounds for discipline.293 In addition, the court explained that it is
the criminal conduct, and not the conviction itself, which justifies
discipline.294 Therefore, even a pardon or formal acquittal does not
automatically bar a disciplinary proceeding.295
Before imposing discipline, the court considered mitigating factors. 96 First, the respondent had made full restitution to the client
before he filed his answer to the Administrator's complaint; 297 second, this was the first complaint against him since his admission to
the bar in 1955;298 and third, respondent testified that he suffered
depression due to several family problems at the time the misconduct occurred.2 99 The court stated that the respondent's unfortunate circumstances would not exonerate him; it therefore ordered
an eighteen-month suspension.
In re Kunz 30 involved an attorney who suffered from alcoholism, was convicted for driving under the influence of alcohol, and
fled the state before serving his jail sentence for that conviction.30 2
The attorney later surrendered to authorities.30 3 The Hearing
Board recommended a two-year suspension or, alternatively, "until
further order of court with probation; and that the suspension be
stayed on the condition that the respondent" periodically report to
the Administrator, enter an alcohol abuse treatment program, and
abstain from alcohol. 301 The Review Board recommended a oneyear suspension, or until further order of the court with probation
stayed on the condition he enter a treatment program, abstain from
alcohol, and subject himself to any of the Administrator's requirements for supervisory purposes.3 °5
The court acknowledged that the respondent admitted to all of
recommended a three-month suspension, two members recommended a two-year suspension, and one member recommended a six-month suspension. Id.
293. Id. at 232, 520 N.E.2d at 307. This rule applies even if such conduct does not
constitute moral turpitude. Id.
294. Id. at 233, 520 N.E.2d at 307.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 227-28, 520 N.E.2d at 304.
298. Id. at 234, 520 N.E.2d at 307.
299. Id. at 235, 520 N.E.2d at 308.
300. Id. at 235-36, 520 N.E.2d at 308.
301. 122 Ill. 2d 547, 524 N.E.2d 544 (1988).
302. Id. at 549-50, 524 N.E.2d at 545.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 548, 524 N.E.2d at 544.
305. Id. at 548-49, 524 N.E.2d at 545.
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the allegations against him, including being an alcoholic. 3° Moreover, the respondent claimed to be in a treatment program30 7 and
that his disease evidently did not affect his ability to serve his clients.30 Based on these factors and the fact that probation generally is used to deal with alcoholic attorneys, 3° the court ordered a
two-year suspension stayed on the following conditions: The presentation of proof that he is in an alcohol abuse treatment program
and abstaining from alcohol; and that he comply with any reasonable condition the Administrator ordered.310
H.

Reinstatement Proceedings

During the Survey year, the court issued two opinions that considered petitions for reinstatement to the bar.311 In both cases the
3 12
petitions were denied.
Petitioner was disbarred on consent in In re Anglin after being
convicted of possession of stolen securities and after he refused, on
more than one occasion, to name others who were involved in the
scheme to sell the stolen securities. 31

The Hearing and Review

Boards both recommended that respondent be reinstated to the
bar. 3 4 The court nevertheless explained that the petitioner continued to refuse to answer questions relating to the identity of the
other attorneys involved in the scheme. 31

This code of silence, the

court ruled, showed a present inability to adhere to the Code of
Professional Responsibility which requires lawyers to report the
misconduct of other attorneys. 1 6 Because the petitioner bears the
306. Id. at 551, 524 N.E.2d at 546.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 553, 524 N.E.2d at 547. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 758 governs the
problem of drug or alcohol addiction and mental diseases. ILL. S. Cr. R. 758, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110A, para. 758 (1987). Rule 758(c) provides for an attorney's transfer to
inactive status if the court determines that he is "incapacitated from continuing to practice law ....
ILL. S. CT. R. 758(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 758(c) (1987).
309. Kunz, 122 Ill. 2d at 552, 524 N.E.2d at 546. See supra note 165 and accompanying text for a discussion of Rule 772.
310. Kunz, 122 Ill. 2d at 554, 524 N.E.2d at 547.
311. The two cases considered were In re Anglin, 122 Ill. 2d 531, 524 N.E.2d 550
(1988), and In re Powers, 122 Ill. 2d 18, 521 N.E.2d 921 (1988). Rule 767 governs reinstatement and it includes six factors to consider in order to determine rehabilitation. ILL.
S. CT. R. 767, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 767 (1987). See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
312. Anglin, 122 Ill. 2d at 540, 524 N.E.2d at 555; Powers, 122 Il1. 2d at 22, 521
N.E.2d at 923.
313. Anglin, 122 Ill. 2d at 533-34, 524 N.E.2d at 552.
314. Id. at 533, 524 N.E.2d at 551.
315. Id. at 539, 524 N.E.2d at 554.
316.

Id. See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1-103, ILL. REV. STAT.
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burden of proving rehabilitation by clear and convincing evidence,317 the court held that his code of silence belies any other
evidence in his favor.31 s Thus, the court denied reinstatement to
the bar.319
L

Rulings on ProceduralIssues

The court decided two cases during the Survey year that primarily involved procedural issues. In one case the court reviewed the
requirements that a complaint must meet in order to withstand dismissal, 320 and in another case it addressed
two procedural issues
3 21
involving the imposition of sanctions.
The issues addressed in In re Mitan 322 presented the court with
the question of whether Illinois Rule of Civil Procedure 2-6 11323
applied to disciplinary proceedings. 24 The court also addressed
whether sanctions should be imposed on the attorneys representing
respondent and whether sanctions should be imposed on the Administrator prosecuting the case.325
The Administrator requested that the respondent's attorneys be
sanctioned for filing a fraudulent and frivolous petition for reinstatement on behalf of respondent.3 26 The court explained that its
duty to regulate the practice of law authorizes the court to impose
sanctions where a false petition for reinstatement is filed.327 It declared the appropriate standard to be an "objectively reasonable
inquiry" into the relevant facts and law. 32 As for the attorneys
charged, the court stated that the Administrator had not proven
ch. 110A, CANON 1 (1987). Specifically, the court stated "[p]etitioner's continuing belief
in a code of silence and nondisclosure of the misconduct of others under the circumstances described prevents us from concluding that he is clearly and convincingly rehabilitated and currently fit to practice law." Anglin, 122 Ill. 2d at 539, 524 N.E.2d at 554.
317. Anglin, 122 Ill. 2d at 537, 524 N.E.2d at 553.
318. Id. at 540, 524 N.E.2d at 555.
319. Id.
320. In re Beatty, 118 Ill. 2d 489, 517 N.E.2d 1065 (1987).
321. In re Mitan, 119 Ill. 2d 229, 518 N.E.2d 1000 (1987). The issue involving the
named petitioner was a motion to withdraw his petition for reinstatement; the court reserved ruling on this motion. Id. at 258, 518 N.E.2d at 1013.
322. 119 Ill. 2d 229, 518 N.E.2d 1000 (1987).
323. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-611 (1987). Paragraph 2-611 requires an attorney to verify that he has made a " 'reasonable inquiry' " into the facts and law of everything filed in state court. Mitan, 119 Ill. 2d at 243, 518 N.E.2d at 1006 (quoting ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-611 (1987)). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
324. Mitan, 119 Ill. 2d at 242, 518 N.E.2d at 1006.
325. Id. at 239, 518 N.E.2d at 1004.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 246, 518 N.E.2d at 1008.
328. Id. at 247, 518 N.E.2d at 1008. Although the court was explicit in stating that
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that there was no objectively reasonable inquiry made.32 9 Furthermore, the court asserted that the Administrator was partially to
blame for the attorneys' lack of information. 33 0 Consequently, the
court refused to impose sanctions on the attorneys.331
The attorneys argued that the Administrator violated his duty of
privacy and confidentiality.3 32 The Administrator's alleged misconduct was a statement which revealed that these attorneys were
"under scrutiny" based on their drawing and filing of Mitan's petition. 333 Although the court thought that the statement was ambiguous, it was persuaded by the Administrator that the statement
only referred to the court's scrutiny of the sanction issue brought
against the attorneys. 334 The court decided that the statement did
not announce a disciplinary investigation; therefore, the Administrator had not violated his duty to preserve confidentiality.335
Thus, the court also denied sanctions against the Administrator.336
In In re Beatty, 337 six respondents were charged with numerous
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility 33 s based on an
alleged anti-retention committee that they organized to oppose two
circuit court judges.3 39 The Hearing Board found that the com-

plaint did not allege the respondents knowingly made false statements sufficient to constitute a cause of action. 310 Furthermore,
the complaint did not specify which false statements were attribuparagraph 2-611 does not apply in disciplinary proceedings, it likened the inquiry to Rule
2-611 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. Id.
329. Id. at 248, 518 N.E.2d at 1008-09.
330. Id. The court explained that the Administrator failed to communicate with the
respondent's attorneys and failed to set a date on which the attorneys could examine the
ARDC's files on Mitan. Id.
331. Id. at 258, 518 N.E.2d at 1013.
332. Id. at 256, 518 N.E.2d at 1012. This duty arises pursuant to Rule 766. ILL. S.
CT. R. 766, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 766 (1987). The charges against the Administrator and the attorneys were levied at the supreme court level. Mitan, 119 Ill. 2d at
256, 518 N.E.2d at 1012.
333. Mitan, 119 Ill. 2d at 257, 518 N.E.2d at 1013. The statement was contained in a
sentence in the Administrator's memo in support of his motion for sanctions against the
attorneys. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. 118 I11.2d 489, 517 N.E.2d 1065 (1987).
338.

They were charged with violating CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Rule 1-101(a)(2), (a)(4), (a)(5), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, CANON 1 (1987), and CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 8-102(a)-(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, CA-

NON 8 (1987). Beatty, 118 Ill. 2d at 490, 517 N.E.2d at 1066.
339. Beatty, 118 Ill. 2d at 491, 517 N.E.2d at 1066.
340. Id. at 497, 517 N.E.2d at 1069.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 20

table to the respondents.34 Therefore, the complaint failed to no34 2
tify each respondent of the particular charge against him.
Consequently, the
Board dismissed the Administrator's complaint
43
3

with prejudice.

The court affirmed the Hearing Board's findings. 3 4 It also
stated that the complaint was required to charge specific allegations of fact as to the professional misconduct of each attorney.34
In addition, the court declared that a complaint which does not
allege the essential elements for recovery will not be remedied by
permissive construction.346 Thus, the case was dismissed.347
IV.

CONCLUSION

During the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court manifested a
strong concern for safeguarding the public from attorneys whose
conduct departs from the standards set forth in the Code of Professional Responsibility. It also faced several difficult issues to resolve. For the first time, it addressed the problems posed by a
candidate for admission to the bar whose admission had initially
been approved by a court-created agency, but whose background
was permeated with serious misconduct. The court further faced
the effect of ambiguity in a rule on bench-bar relations which will
be applied with frequency as numerous Greylord related cases remain unresolved.34 8 The court also decided that sanctions may be
imposed on attorneys who fail to make reasonable inquiries into
petitions for reinstatement that they draft and file.
Admittedly, at first glance, there may be concern for a lack of
predictability and uniformity in the court's decisions. A careful
scrutiny, however, reveals a supreme court that refuses to apply
general rules haphazardly. The varying severity of sanctions imposed, even as to similar misconduct, results from the court's care341. Id. at 496-97, 517 N.E.2d at 1068.
342. Id. at 498, 517 N.E.2d at 1069.
343. Id. at 493, 517 N.E.2d at 1066. The Review Board joined the Hearing Board's
decision. Id. at 493, 517 N.E.2d at 1066-67.
344. Id. at 500, 517 N.E.2d at 1070.
345. Id. at 499, 517 N.E.2d at 1069-70. The court explained that the complaint must
contain a statement of facts that constitutes a cause of action. Id. at 499, 517 N.E.2d at
1069.
346. Id. at 500, 517 N.E.2d at 1070.
347. Id.
348. 1987 ARDC ANN. REP. at 6 (1988). See, e.g., In re D'Angelo, No. 66514 (Ill.
Dec. 15, 1988) (LEXIS, States Library, Ill file); In re Karzov, No. 65947 (Ill. Dec. 15,
1988) (LEXIS, States Library, Ill file); In re Powell, No. 65387 (Ill. Dec. 15, 1988)
(LEXIS, States Library, Ill file); In re Heller, No. 66768 (Ill. Dec. 6, 1988) (LEXIS,
States Library, Ill file).
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ful study of the facts and consideration of both aggravating and
mitigating factors in each case.

